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I. Aim and Method of the Study 
1. Aim of the Study 
On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
united with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). On October 14, 
1990, elections were held in the five new east German states (Länder), which 
have constituted anew. Now the Federal Republic of Germany consists of 15 
federal states and the capital, Berlin. The country's population amounts to 77,3 
million. Economic and social problems arise from the unification, since the new 
federal states have lagged behind the older ones in their economic, social, and 
technical-scientifical developments by decades. Of course, the unification 
causes criminological problems as well, three of them I shall go into detail 
about, together with a fourth, complicating one: 
— In wich way will the forthcoming economic, social, technological, and 
scientific development influence crime causation? 
— Which effect will the total transformation of the political and 
economic structure in the five new federal states have on the development of 
criminality? 
— In which way will the newly-emerged society in the Federal Republic 
of Germany cope with the problems cause by the fact that the leaders of the 
former German Democratic Republic acted in a criminal way themselves, that 
they built an oppressing state which monitored all its citizens' movements and 
that the criminal justice system threatened all those citizens with penal 
prosecution who were in opposition to the then ruling communist system or 
who wanted to leave the state territory? 
These three complex problems are worsened by the fact that presently a 
massive migration from East- to West Germany as well as from Eastern Europe 
and the developing countries into the Federal Republic takes place. My mandate 
is not only to cover these four problems on an empirical-criminological basis, 
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but also to influence their solution in such a way that as little criminality as 
possible emerges — in other words, to develop recommendations for the 
prevention of crime causation. There do exist empmcal-criminological studies 
carried out by German criminologists about the influence of World War I on the 
development of criminality in Germany and Austria1 and also studies about the 
effects of the post-World War II depression on the development of criminality in 
the remaining part of Germany2. The results of these studies, however, are of 
very limited use for the solution of these complex problems we are faced with at 
present. 
2. Method of the Study 
In order to solve the above outlined prediction- and prevention 
problems of the five new federal states, we must in the first place take a closer 
look at the extent and structure of criminality and its control in the German 
Democratic Republic during its forty years of existence in comparison to the 
Federal Republic of Germany and also at the extent and structure of the 
criminality in the five new states today. These; questions are very hard to answer. 
This is because criminologists in the GDR were for forty years occupied with the 
task to mask the factual situation of criminality in their country and thus to 
secure the all encompassing controll of the communist bureaucracy. The 
communist leadership allowed them no insight whatsoever into the real criminal 
statistical data which constituted a state secret and were regularly and 
systematically faked and varnished. The leaders themselves had no wish to be 
informed about the real situation because they were convinced of the dogmatic 
thesis which held: "Criminality is a phenomenon of capitalism; it is incompatible 
with socialism"3. Hardly ever was criminological research carried out in the 
German Democratic Republic, but if it happened the results remained 
unpublished, they were made a state secret. Should the findings have revealed 
the true situation of criminality, it could have proved disadvantageous for the 
career of the empirical-criminological scholar. Communist bureaucracy in its 
entirety held the belief that "criminality is a remainder of capitalism. With the 
extinction of capitalism criminality will die out". Thus almost all studies of 
criminologists from the GDR are irrelevant for answering our question 
concerning the factual situation. 
In order to nevertheless answer the question, I attempted to examine 
the documents and other material stored in the East Berlin ministries. The files 
are in a chaotic state. It will take years to sort them out and to analyse them 
adequately. To find answers for the time being I collected observations and 
1 Moritz Uepmanm Krieg und Kriminalität in Deutschland. Stuttgart / Berlin / Leipzig ' 
New Häven, 1930; Franz Exner. Krieg und Kriminalität in Österreich. New Häven / Wien 1927. 
2 Karl S. Bader. Soziologie der deutschen Nachkriegskriminalität. Tübingen 1949-
3 John Lekscbas, Harri Harrtand, Richard Hartmann, Günter Lebmann'. Kriminologie. 
Berlin 1983. 
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questioned experts on the territory of the five new federal states and in East 
Berlin. I held a series of lectures about controversial criminological subjects to 
extremely mixed audiences. I have carefully observed and analysed reactions, 
questions, and critical remarks on the part of the listeners. I then went on to 
interview a considerable number of experts, police chiefs of several cities, 
public procecutors, judges, heads of correctional institutions, and professors of 
penal law and criminology. Their information, however, must be interpreted 
with great caution for the reason that the criminal justice system on the whole 
and all universities were staffed in a way that only committed communists were 
given key positions. Very probably a large number of those persons questioned 
by me will lose their top posts in the near future and will be replaced by other 
people. In order to maintain maximum objectivity during my observations and 
interviews I was accompanied by our visiting professor Denis Szabo (Montreal), 
who controlled my observations and hearing. My research continues. In the 
planning is a research symposium with some 30 criminological theorists and 
practitioners from East- and West Germany, which is due to be held in 
Miinster/Germany in spring 1992. About five foreign criminologists, who all 
were visiting professors at my department at one time, and who are familiar with 
methods of comparative criminology as well as with German conditions are to 
have advisory functions. 
II. Criminality, Criminological Research, and Social Conrol Before the 
Unification 
1. Political, Economic, and Social Structures of the Two German States Before 
Their Unification 
Like the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic 
was founded after World War II in the year 1949. After three million people left 
the country and resettled in the FRG, a wall was erected between both countries 
in 1961. The GDR border police was given order to shoot fugitives. In the 
German Democratic Republic a one party dictatorship of the Communist Party 
was installed following the Soviet Union's model. The Federal Republic of 
Germany developed to a constitutional, pluralistic democracy after the model of 
the Western European and North American countries. In the GDR, the state was 
organized centralistically, whereas the FRG is a decentralized, federative state. 
In the GDR, a unitarian, socialistic planned economy was set up; in the FRG a 
free social market economy developed. Private ownership of the means of 
production was ablished in the German Democratic Republic after their 
nationalization. Large estate owners were expropriated; industry was 
nationalized. Leading officials of the Communist Party were given charge of the 
means of production and the power to distribute the goods of state production 
as well as social positions. Decisions and orders from the Party's top floor had 
to be accepted by the "masses" without objection. The Party élite was furnished 
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with privileges of all kinds. Although it only represented 1,896 of die country's 
population4 the élite ran a perfected surveillance network aimed at dissidents, 
the "Department of State Security" (Staatssicherheitsdienst, StaSi). Members of 
the underground opposition and dissidents were subject to.penal prosecution. 
The StaSi, which nominally had to protect the state against spies from outside as 
well as to protect industry against sabotage from within, was assigned the task of 
suppressing any kind of opposition and also to safeguard the power held by the 
Communist Party. The élite firmly believed to be in posession of absolute truth. 
Crimes .were considered personal problems since the opinion prevailed that 
societal problems would disappear with the consequential construction of 
socialism. Criminology was an instrument of propaganda; it was bound to 
protect the one party dictatorship of the Communist Party. The belief was that 
the nationalization of the means of production would invariably produce a new 
type of man, a "socialist personality", who would not commit any offences. The 
whole élite in politics, economy, and the sciences were selected under political 
and ideological aspects and educated accordingly. 
The construction and upholding of this political, economic, and social 
framework by force led to its-complete collapse in the years 1989 and 1990. 
Large proportions of the young, creative, and innovative population turned their 
back on their country and left via Hungary, who had opened her borders. In the 
most densely populated, industrialized south of the German Democratic 
Republic peaceful mass demonstrations took place every Monday with hundreds 
of thousands participants. The Soviet Union did not intervene with her military 
forces stationed in the GDR. The peaceful revolution led up to the unification of 
both the German states on October 3, 1990, with a rapid self fulfilling prophecy. 
The following reasons were decisive for the political, economic, and societal 
collapse of the German Democratic Republic: 
— The totalitarian system, which had lost its reproductive ability, 
choked on its ever growing bureaucracy and on the spying on its own 
population. The Department of State Security employed 85.000 staff and at least 
109.000 "freelance" agents5. At least one in twenty of the working population 
worked for the StaSi (total population of the former GDR: 16,7 million). The 
political system proved unable to modernize and reform the country by means 
of adapting production and public life to the requirements of a progressing 
technology. 
— The more heavy the pressure on the population grew as a 
consequence of the state intelligence network thcless prepared people were to 
work hard in the state owned factories for the existing system. Hand in hand 
with this ever decreasing will to perform the country fell behind the technical 
standard. Modernization of the country via up-to-date technology would have 
4 Dieter Voigt, Werner Voß, Sabine Meek: Sozialstruktur der DDR. Darmstadt 1987, p. 
171. 
5 Karl Wilhelm Fricke: "Polizei und Staatssicherheitsdienst". Alexander Fischer (ed.): Die 
Deutsche Demokratische Republik. Darmstadt 1988, pp. 113-116. 
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required free, innovative, open minden, socially and regionally mobile people, 
who would have had to be paid adequately. This, however, is exactly the group 
of citizens who were suppressed most severely in the GDR. Not the busy, 
creative, and competent persons climbed up the career ladder, but they who 
adopted the communist ideology totally and who submitted themselves to the 
communist apparatus. 
— Following this lack of ability to modernization and self renewal, 
which was system immanent, were major economical and societal crises. 
Frequently there were shortages in the supply of consumer goods. GDR 
products could not any more compete on the open world market. And in spite 
of the fact that the number of weekly working hours steadily increased, 
productivity — the output per head of the work force — came down rapidly 
compared with the FRG. Towards the end it was no more than half of that in the 
Federal Republic of Germany6. Another consequence of this economic decline is 
the fact that construction and maintenance of roads and houses as well as the 
modernization and extension of the telephone network were totally neglected. 
This, too, goes for environmental protection and generally for the upkeeping of 
the whole infrastructure. Historically valuable town centres and culturally 
important monuments decayed; ruins of houses can be seen everywhere. Brown 
soft coal, gained in open-cast mining, contributed prominently to air pollution. 
Likewise, the pollution of drinking water and of the soil had long become 
intolerable. 
— In the face of pressure on the part of the state the population 
suffered for decades from these adverse conditions. Held back by wall and mine 
strips the people did not have got a chance to see for themselves the far 
superior economic and social development of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
although the electronic mass media of the FRG, which could be received almost 
throughout the GDR, conveyed a relatively reliable picture. 
2. Extent and Structure of Criminality, Criminological Research, and Social 
Control in Both German States Before their Unification 
If we compare the older states of the Federal Republic of Germany with 
comparable industrialized nations we find that extent and severity of crimes 
committed is more or less similar to that of France or Britain. There are, 
however, industrialized countries where criminality — according to their official 
statistics — is far higher and much more severe (e.g. USA) and also countries 
where criminality is notably lower and less severe (e.g. Japan)7. Apart from 
crimes against property, like burglary, theft, or fraud, road traffic offences play a 
considerable role. Violence and sexually motivated offences are of lesser 
6 Karl C. Tbalbeim: "Volkswirtschaft". Alexander Fischer (ed.): Die Deutsche 
P mokratische Republik. Darmstadt 1988, pp. 86-91. 
7 Hans Joachim Schneider. Kriminologie. Berlin / New York 1987, pp. 284/5. 
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significance. Widespread, however, are professional, environmental, economic, 
and organized crime. 
Criminality in the GDR was much lower before she united with the FRG. 
The crime rate (i.e. the number of offences per 100.000 inhabitants) for the year 
1988 was pretended to be 715®. In the same year the Federal Republic had a 
crime rate of 7.1149. This would mean that criminality in the Federal Republic 
was nearly ten times as high, but this is totally unrealistic. Criminal statistics in 
the GDR were manipulated for propaganda reasons. Political crime was not 
included in that figure. The extent of offences against the communist system was 
to remain a secret. Offences committed by the Party leadership themselves were 
not considered criminal. A considerable part of criminality, namely offences of 
lesser or average gravity, were dealed with by "societal" courts of justice, the 
"Workers' Conflict Commissions" (Betriebskonfliktkommissionen). This type of 
criminality also did not appear in the crime statistics. Almost no indictment was 
brought in against environmental offenders. Finally, criminal statistics were 
falsified up to 25%. We know at least that criminality in the GDR was similar, 
although violent crime had a marginally bigger share, and economical crime was 
significantly different in its appearance than in the FRG. The mere uttering of a 
differing opinion already constituted political criminality against the communist 
system (agitation against the state), and so did the attempt to flee the republic. 
The members of the "Politbüro" (the Party élite) lived in Wandlitz near 
East Berlin, a sealed-off colony, in 23 houses surrounded by Western luxury 
goods. Up to 600 personnel was at their command. In the shopping centre of 
the village, western consumer goods were available to them at spectacularly low 
prices. They had houses built for their sons and daughters paid for by the state. 
They had themselves built luxurious guest houses and went out hunting in 
grounds of enormous size which were declared military zones out of limits for 
the public. The German federal public prosecutor currently investigates against 
numerous communist leaders for corruption and abuse of power. The élite are 
said to be tied up in illegal arms- and currency deals and allegedly sheltered 
internationally wanted terrorists. The Communist Party leadership installed the 
Department of State Security which was to suppress any opposition of people 
holding differing opinions — this was called "political underground activity", 
whereas the criminology merely had propaganda tasks, criminalistics were 
developed with great personal and financial efforts. The StaSi not only spied on 
the opposition but also on their own people. Every work brigade had one or 
two members who passed on information and reports to the StaSi. Countless 
citizens were forced to cooperate with the Department by blackmail. Many 
others received privileges. For instance, students of theology had their studies 
paid for and in return delivered reports from inside the church organizations. 
No important decision was made without consulting the Stasi files. The 
Staatssicherheitsdients opened mail, read and analysed it. By using key replicas 
8 Dokumentation: Aus der DDR-Kriminalstatistik 1988. Neue Justiz 1989, p- 324. 
9 Bundeskriminalamt: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1988. Wiesbaden 1989, p. 11. 
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they broke into flats. They also applied psychical torture. For example, suspects 
were locked up for months in cells not larger than 10 square metres and were 
questioned daily. 
The reasons for the low crime rate in the German Democratic Republic 
in comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany are manifold. They are, 
however, not rooted in the emergence of a "socialist conscience" or a "socialist 
personality" as a consequence of the nationalization of the means of production, 
as the "socialist criminology" wanted us to believe. Rather, the following reasons 
for a lower crime rate can be named: 
— The criminal justice system extinguished a considerable part of 
criminality by acting criminally through its close connection with the StaSi and 
its lack of constitutionalism. It was not as tolerant as its counterpart in the FRG: 
Around 79% of all suspects were subject to penal conviction compared to a 
figure of 33% in the FRG. The work collective was used as a means of control 
during and also after working hours. 
— The population density and the share of people living in big cities 
were both lower in the German Democratic Republic than in the Federal 
Republic. There was less urban concentration; the population lived in small or 
middle towns or in the country. The proportion of foreigners was lower than in 
the FRG. Thus the GDR's population was more homogenous. Less social 
disorganization developed although the divorce rate was much higher in the 
GDR than in the FRG. 
— Societal mobility was lower in the GDR than in the FRG. Professional 
and regional mobility- was restricted. Travel opportunities, e.g. mass tourism, 
were strictly limited. Road traffic offences or vehicle theft were far less common; 
many crimes did not occur simply because the motorization level was far lower. 
— The gross national (inland) product of the German Democratic 
Republic was lower than that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Material 
goods were harder to obtain and socially less visible than in the FRG. Thus the 
saturation level of material goods was far lower than in the FRG. Consumer 
goods were held in higher esteem and were watched more closely. 
— The young were tightly incorporated into society. They were 
controlled more closely by the communist youth- and childrens' organizations 
and were weighed down by the production process at a much earlier age. 
It is obvious that these tight informal and formal social controls are 
incompatible with the free, constitutional, and democratic social system of 
Western tradition. Also obvious is the fact that the reasons for the lower crime 
rate are the totalitarian, dictatorial, and partly criminal social controls and the 
economical and social underdevelopment of the former GDR, as opposed to the 
claimed emergence of a "socialist personality". 
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III. Crime, Criminological Research and Criminal Policy in the Two Former 
German States after their Unification 
1. The Present Situation 
On October 3, 1990 a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the German Democratic Republic became effective according to which the 
West German criminal justice system was by and large extended upon the 
territory of the former GDR This abrupt change of the GDR's legal system 
following the unification will have its effects upon the political structure, later 
on upon the economic, and finally upon the social structure of the former 
German Democratic Republic. These all will be long lasting social processes. 
Together with this change of the social framework the structure of criminality 
will alter significantly. 
Not much, however, has changed up to now. The political structure of 
the new federal states is forming. Although with the introduction of the West 
German currency the amount of consumer goods in the shops has increased 
greatly, the diversity and variety has by now reached only about 40% of the West 
German level. The number of motor vehicles has nearly doubled in this short 
time because the people in the former GDR have bought up nearly all used cars 
in the FRG. The road network, already in bad shape, cannot take this increase in 
the number of cars. Since the people were not used to this amount of traffic, the 
number of road traffic offences has risen sharply. Also, shoplifting is on the up. 
Vandalism, too, has grown since. Already several spectacular bank robberies 
have occurred because safety measure of the banks are not yet up to standard 
and the employees of the banks have not yet accustomed themselves to the new 
situation. 
Criminality has not yet risen unproportionally, for the economic 
underdevelopment has not changed considerably. Because of the low wages 
mobility still is restricted. Many young people still prefer settling down in one of 
the older West German states to living in East German cities, so that up to now 
no conurbations, no congested areas after West German models have emerged. 
Supply of consumer goods has not yet as widely distributed as in West Germany. 
The criminal justice system still employs the old personnel, who, however, are 
faced with the population's mistrust. One good point is that the East German 
criminal justice system is now bound to apply West German law. Political 
prisoners have been released from the correctional institutions. 
2. Prognosis for the Federal Republic of Gf many With Special Reference to the 
New East German States 
a) Criminality. In the Western part of the Federal Republic criminality 
will rise further. As a consequence of the massive influx of resettlers from East 
Germany and Eastern Eur( pe as well as of people seeking political asylum and 
of economic fugitives from the developing countries the emergence of 
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disorganized orban ghetto- and slum areas must be anticipated. As things stand 
the housing problem will be solved by building gigantic high rise blocks of flats 
where no lively social structure or a community feeling has the chance to 
develop. With the imminent abolition of borders throughout Western Europe a 
rise of organized crime can safely be expected. 
In the new East German states and in East Berlin criminality will slowly 
but steadily rise to the West German level in line with the economic and social 
development. The following reasons are relevant for this process: 
— Closely connected with the social and economic change are social 
and economic ascents and descents of people. Many will be unhappy with their 
own drop or their insufficient rise compared with other. Many, too, will have 
exaggerated expectations which will never be met. Therefore, many crimes will 
be committed out of the feeling of deprivation or frustration. 
— The social and economic change and development will bring about 
changes in the value notions system, in the role of models, and in the 
population's lifestyles. During the process of this shift, old and new attitudes 
and lifestyles will exist alongside each other. This will produce interpersonal 
conflicts, which need to be solved in a peaceful manner. Since a part of the 
population, namely the young and the lower classes, have never properly 
learned peaceful strategies of conflict solution, a rise in the crime rate is almost 
inevitable. 
— A sharp rise in the number of property offences following the societal 
and economic change and development will be attributable to an increased 
access to material goods and to the increased difficulty of enforcing controls. 
This rise will happen especially in metropolitan urban areas, for the anonymous 
urban lifestyle on the one hand makes committing a crime much easier for the 
offender and on the other hand complicates his seizure and his conviction. The 
easy access to consumer goods changes their appreciation in the population. 
Potential victims are not watchful enough of their property. 
— With the emergence of a social market economy interpersonal 
competition and occupational pressure will grow; better performance will be 
expected. At the same time the variety of leisure time activities grows. Life 
becomes faster and more interesting. The strain on the adults caused by job and 
leisure activities leads to neglecting children and adolescents. Parallel to this, 
the education of the young becomes longer and harder. Juveniles try to escape 
the pressure of grownup life. Youth subcultures will emerge: societal retreats 
with their specific juvenile language, clothing, and music. The young cannot 
sufficiently identify themselves with the adults such as parents or teachers, and 
become increasingly susceptible for delinquency. 
— The ongoing exodus of people from East- to West Germany and the 
shortage of tax revenue of the new federal states lead up to the 
underdevelopment of the East German and the overburdening of the West 
German infrastructure. For example, there exists a shortage of well educated 
skilled workers in East Germany due to their low income; road and 
communication networks and also environmental protection about the speed of 
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the social and economic development on the one hand and the factual 
possibilities on the other opens the door to mounting dissatisfaction and 
ensuing criminality. 
— Finally, all these social and economic changes will further speed up 
the societal disorganization which had set in decades ago in the German 
Democratic Republic. Social and interpersonal interaction will become 
defective. Social groups such as schools, families, neighbourhoods, 
occupational and leisure time groups lose their capacity of informal social 
control. This must not be confused with self help or the extension of the state 
control network; much rather it constitutes a voluntary, democratic self control. 
b) Criminology. Empirical-criminological research has not developed 
adequately well in the Western part of the Federal Republic of Germany; too 
great are the reservations against this discipline from the left as well as from the 
right side of the political spectrum. The liberal mainstream criminology is 
personnelly underrepresented in the Western part of the FRG. Now the East 
German regression adds to the problem. The East German criminologists — few 
as they are anyway — are poorly trained in Western European and North 
American criminology, to say the least. Many are still tangled up in communist 
ideology, or in what is left of Marxism-Leninism. A sociologically oriented 
criminology could not develop in the former GDR. Those precious few 
criminologists of a younger generation are psychologists and therefore 
concentrate chiefly upon the personality structures of offenders. Those experts 
in criminal law who also carry out criminological research in their spare time 
will be busy for years incorporating the West German penal law. The complete 
judicial' system in East Germany has to be thoroughly revised. For the time 
being, it can only be adapted to the West German system — there simply is no 
time for the necessary reforms. 
c) Social Control. Together with the development of the communist 
system into a liberal, democratic one and also with the social changes in the 
new federal states in the East of Germany social control — the reaction upon 
criminality — will change, too. Emphasis will be placed upon the fact that the 
criminal justice system has to be built in accordance with constitutional rights. 
Constitutionality, however, is a process; it has to be fought for every day anew. 
Communist resistance in East Germany must not be underestimated. The 
criminal justice system will become more liberal and tolerant. If it will be based 
upon liberal and democratic principles of facing criminality this will lead to a 
reduction of crimes in the long run because the population's faith and trust in 
justice will be reinforced. In the growing process of humanization of society the 
population will become more sensitive to violence — this, too, goes for offences 
in the social vicinity — and also will be more prepared to report petty crime to 
the police. 
d) Criminal-Political Recommendations. There is no space for 
differentiated recommendations. For that reason I shall only evolve a few 
principal theses: 
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— The organization of the criminal justice system under constitutional 
aspects can only be welcomed wholeheartedly. Still, there is a danger that 
constitutionality will be applied to the offender only but not to the victim as 
well. 
— The constitutional reorganisation of the criminal justice system must 
not lead to social control being restricted too much to the criminal justice. The 
democratic element, the voluntary, free, and individual responsibility of the 
citizens for informal social control as well as their participation in the criminal 
justice system must not be neglected. 
— The population must be informed truthfully about the criminality 
problems and their causes so that they can realize them. This is because 
criminality can only be controlled within and together with society, not without 
or even against it. 
— It is not enough to rely solely on the adaptation of the economic and 
social structures in the new East German to the old West German federal states. 
Rather, the state must aid the societal learning process in which new norms, 
ideals, and lifestyles will be adopted. 
— The populations^ trust in the criminal justice and in the 
trustworthiness of the police, judges, and correctional officers must be 
reinstated by way of removing all those persons from their positions who do not 
feel committed to constitutionality and democracy in the Western sense. 
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